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Notes
CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY AND NECESSITY OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO TRANSFER STOCK-Relator

sought a writ of mandamus to compel defendant corporation to
transfer eight shares of stock, standing on the corporate books in
the name of W. Wallace, to the relator's name. Defendant corporation contended that the stock had not first been offered to the
corporation as required by one of its by-laws. The stock was originally issued to the relator in payment of attorney's fees, but was
put in his negro chauffeur's name for the convenience of the corporation, which was composed of negro stockholders. Held, while
the by-law might prevent the relator's sale of the stock unless he
complied with its provisions, it could not prevent the transfer of
the stock from the negro chauffeur to the relator, who was the
true owner. State ex rel. Cabral v. Strudwick FuneralHome, Incorporated,4 So. (2d) 760 (La. App. 1941).
Corporate by-laws and articles frequently embody various
types of restrictions on the transfer of shares. An attempt to condition the transfer upon the consent of officers or other stockholders of the corporation is almost universally held to be an invalid restraint upon alienation.' Only in exceptional cases, where
the stockholders are restricted to persons of special talent or to
family members, 2 have such restrictions been upheld.
A substantial number of decisions have even held invalid a

requirement that the stock be offered to the corporation before it
is sold to an outsider.3 However, the weight of authority and the
a condition of things such as would show a "fault" on the part of the defendant, accompanied by a claim of resulting damage therefrom, and upon the
trial of the case to establish the truth of his allegations. Does the word "damage" mean strictly material damage resulting in pecuniary loss or will the
Louisiana courts in an appropriate case construe it to include mental and
emotional damage (le prdjudice moral) as well?
It might well be argued that since Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes
the so-termed "moral injury" of the French law, a recovery is justified where
insulting language, though not amounting to legal slander, has caused mental
and emotional damage. See notes 11 and 12, supra.
1. McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 Ill. 427, 45 N.E. 954 (1897); Miller v.
Farmers' Milling & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995 (1907); Petoe v.
Baure, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W.(2d) 43 (1928); In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401, 29 N.W.
582 (1886).
2. Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914); Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 Atl. 670 (1901); Wright v. Iredell
Telephone Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921).
3. Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 Atl. 1127 (1896); Ireland
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tendency of the more recent decisions are to uphold the validity of such requirements as reasonable restrictions upon the transfer or sale of stock either as permissible corporate regulations'
or as valid contracts with the corporation.5
The validity of the restriction apparently does not depend
upon whether it is incorporated in the corporate articles or only in
the by-laws." Under the provisions of the Uniform Business Corporations Act, the effect of a restriction, otherwise valid, probably
is not affected by the fact that it is mentioned only in the corporate by-laws.7 However, in jurisdictions where the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act has been adopted, the restriction must be
stated in the stock certificate to bind good faith purchasers.8
The Louisiana court has never ruled definitively on the validity of imposing, as a prerequisite to the transfer of stock, the requirement of a prior offer to the corporation or its stockholders.
The court has held that such a restriction has no effect upon an
otherwise valid pledge, at least until the pledgee seeks to enforce
his rights by sale or transfer of the stock.9
v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 Atl. 258 (1898). A by-law prohibiting sale of
stock to a competitor was held invalid in Kretze v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod
Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916). Cf. Steele v. Farmers' & Merchants'
Mutual Telephone Ass'n, 95 Kan. 580, 148 Pac. 661 (1915) (Kansas statute prohibiting a corporation purchasing its own stock).
4. Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 Atl. 391
(1929); Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902). 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (perm. ed. 1932) 225, § 5456. Cf.
Sterling Loan & Investment Co. v. Litel, 75 Colo. 34, 223 Pac. 753 (1924).
5. Sterling Loan & Investment Co. v. Litel, 75 Colo. 34, 223 Pac. 753 (1924);
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432, 27 L.R.A. 271
(1894); Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920);
Cowles v. Cowles Realty Co., 201 App. Div. 460, 194 N.Y.Supp. 546 (1922). Cf.
Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 At. 670 (1901).
6. In a majority of jurisdictions apparently no distinction is made, since
the limitation arises from public policy against restriction of the right to
alienate property rather than from the manner of adoption of the provision.
See 12 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 4, at 218-226, §§ 5454-5456; Notes (1895) 27
L.R.A. 271, (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 312, (1930) 65 A.L.R. 1159. But see Ireland v.
Globe Milling Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 Atl. 258, 79 Am. St. Rep. 769 (1898). If the restriction is passed as a by-law after the stock is acquired, some courts will
not uphold it on the ground that it deprives minority stockholders of their
rights without their consent. Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn.
367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
7. See Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 26. And see particularly La.
Act. 250 of 1928, § 29 (II) (i) (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1109 (II) (i)]: "By-laws...
may include provisions in respect to: .... (i) the sale or transfer of shares, or
the reservation of lien thereon. .. ."
8. Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 15; La. Act 180 of 1910, § 15 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1194]. See also La. Act 250 of 1928, § 21 [Dart's Stats. (1939) 1
1101).
this provision refers only to transfers of ownership, and not to
9. "...
pledges, its object being to prevent the disposition of the stock to strangers
without first giving the corporation or its members the opportunity of pur-
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NOTES

In State ex rel. Scott v. Caddo Rock Drill Bit Company0 the
court "assumed" the validity of a requirement that no stock be
sold until the other stockholders had an opportunity to purchase
it during a ten day period following notice to the company of intention to sell. 1 Nevertheless, the corporation was ordered to
transfer the stock on its books to the relator's name despite the
fact that the relator's transferor had not complied with the restriction. The facts of the case justify the seemingly anomalous decision. At the time the relator asked for a transfer of the stock to
his name, he also tendered written notice to the corporation of his
intention to sell the stock. This notice, though one step belated,
complied with the spirit, if not the letter, of the restriction. It
afforded other shareholders an opportunity to buy the stock and
thereby prevented a third person from becoming a shareholder.'
An analogous situation is presented in the Strudwick Funeral
Home'8 case. Here again the court refused to pass directly upon
the validity of the restriction, but held it inapplicable to the case.
The corporate officers themselves had requested that they be allowed to place the stock in the relator's chauffeur's name to prevent prospective subscribers from learning that a white person
owned stock in the corporation. The court, looking to the real
nature of the transaction, recognized that the relator was intended to be the real owner when the stock was originally issued,
and held that there was no reason to insist upon compliance with
the restriction when he demanded the transfer.
In view of the limited number and complex nature of the
Louisiana decisions, any summary of the Louisiana law is somewhat conjectural. However, it is probable that the Louisiana
courts will uphold generally the validity of an option restriction, "
Crescent 'City Seltz & Mineral Water Mfg. Co. v. Deblieux, 40
chasing.
La. Ann. 155, 156, 3 So. 726, 727 (1888). See also Factors' & Traders' Insurance
Co. v. Marine Dry Dock & Shipyard Co., 31 La. Ann. 149 (1879).
10. 141 La. 353, 75 So. 78 (1917).
11. See also Bartlett v. Fourton, 115 La. 26, 38 So. 882 (1905). In Martin
v. McCloskey, 155 La. 604, 611, 99 So. 477, 480 (1924), the court more definitely
indicates the validity of such a restriction by a dictum statement that the
obligation bound the plaintiff not to sell said stock without first offering it to
the company at par.
12. It was stressed that "it was of no concern to the other stockholders
. . . that the notice of the intention to sell . .. was given by Geo. C. Scott
[relator] instead of G. H. Jumason [the original stockholder] .... " State ex
rel. Scott v. Caddo Rock Drill Bit Co., 141 La. 353, 359, 75 So. 78, 80 (1917). In
the absence of this circumstance, the bourt could not have found a substantial compliance with the spirit of this restriction.
13. State ex rel. Cabral v. Strudwick Funeral Home, Inc., 4 So.(2d) 760,
761 (La. App. 1941).
14. See note 12, supra.
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but that a strict compliance with its terms will not be required
where the facts or exceptional cases justify a deviation or where
the substantial purpose of the requirement has been met.
R.O.R.

LEGISLATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDMENT BY IMPLICA-

TION-Act 26 of 1914 provided for defrayal of the expenses and
salary of the State Fire Marshal from the proceeds of a tax therein
levied on fire insurance companies doing business in the state.'
The fire marshal drew warrants against the proceeds of this tax.
The state treasurer refused to honor the warrants, relying upon
provisions in the 1940 general appropriation act2 which repealed
all laws providing for continuing appropriations" and made an appropriation to the State Fire Marshal conditioned upon his surrender of all unencumbered funds in his possession or thereafter
collected.4 On suit of the fire marshal for mandamus, held, the
writ was properly issued to compel payment of the warrants. The
provisions of the general appropriation act cannot be considered
as amending Act 26 of 1914, for such a result would violate the
provision of the Louisiana constitution relating to amendment of
a prior law by reference.' State ex rel. Fournet v. Tugwell, 5 So.
(2d) 370 (La. 1941) 6
1. La. Act 26 of 1914, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3545].
2. La. Act 44 of 1940.
3. Id. at § 11: "All continuing appropriations in existence at the time of
the adoption of this Act are hereby expressly discontinued and any provision
of law making or purporting to make any such appropriation is hereby repealed with a view to compliance with the provisions of the Constitution
prohibiting the making of any appropriation for a longer period than two
years."
4. Id. at § 5: "There are hereby appropriated from the State General
Fund, the following amounts. .. ; provided, however, that such appropriations shall be payable out of the State General Fund only on the condition
that there shall have been deposited in the State General Fund, all unencumbered balances on hand as of June 30, 1940, and on the further, condition
that all fees and other receipts of the respective agencies which shall be collected during the period July 1, 1940, through June 30, 1942, shall be deposited
with the State Treasurer to the credit of the State General Fund. The
transfer of such balances and departmental receipts to the State General
Fund is hereby authorized and directed by the Legislature." The State Fire
Marshal is thereafter listed for a specified appropriation.
The general appropriation act also contained the familiar repealing
clause, applying to "all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith." La. Act
44 of 1940, § 15.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17.
6. It is the purpose of this note to consider only the rationale of the decision, not the correctness of the result. In addition to the argument relied
upon by the court, relator's counsel contended that (1) the legislature in-

